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Abstract 
This paper shows that, if observed earnings are the result of employer-employee wage bargaining, under a set of 
specific assumptions, the standard static Mincer equation can be thought as a particular case of a dynamic wage 
equation. Particularly, we argue that the standard static Mincer equation is implicitly based on the hypothesis that the 
employee has full bargaining power, and provide (further) empirical evidence against this hypothesis.
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1. Introduction 
 
A seminal book by Jacob Mincer (1974) is the starting point of a large body of literature 
dealing with the estimation of a wage equation where the logarithm of the hourly 
observed earnings of an individual is explained by his/her schooling years s and by 
his/her potential labor-market experience z.  
As argued by Heckman et al. (2003), the standard Mincerian framework has two main 
features. First, it provides an explanation why the logarithm of the net potential earnings 
of an individual at time zst += , say tnpeln , can be approximately represented as a 
function of s and z, where z keeps the post-schooling investment in human capital into 
account (α  is a scalar): 
 
2
3210t zzsnpeln α+α+α+α≈                                                                                       (1)        
 
Second, it is based on the assumption that, at any time st ≥ , the observed earnings of 
an individual, say twln , are equal to the monetary value of the individual net 
productivity, measured by his/her net potential earnings, i.e.: 
 
tt npelnwln =                                                                                                                 (2) 
 
Replacing (1) into (2) provides the standard static Mincer equation, i.e.: 
 
2
3210t zzswln α+α+α+α≈                                                                                          (3) 
 
This paper does not question expression (1) and focuses on assumption (2). From a 
theoretical point of view, assumption (2) fits within the perfect-competition framework 
where the nominal wage equals the monetary value of the marginal labor productivity. 
However, if one believes that the imperfect-competition framework is a more realistic 
view of the labor market1, then several arguments can support the statement that 
assumption (2) is unlikely to hold. This manuscript focuses on one of the possible 
arguments: the existence of wage bargaining at employer-employee level. Additional 
arguments (asymmetric information, role of unions and efficiency wages) will be briefly 
discussed in the last Section of this paper.     
   
2. Theory 
 
The standard Mincerian model puts particular emphasis on the supply side: the more an 
individual invests in his/her human-capital development, the higher his/her wage is. The 
model that is presented in this Section aims at enhancing the role played by demand 
factors in determining wages, without diminishing the one played by supply factors. 
More explicitly, the argument is that schooling and post-schooling investments provide 
individuals with net potential earnings, meaning skills required to earn a given amount 
of money. However, observed earnings are likely to be the result of both employee’s 
skills (supply) and employer’s willingness to pay (demand). Since real-life labor 
                                                 
1 A general reference is the New Keynesian view of the labor market.   
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markets are characterized by wage bargaining, the possibility of a margin-formation 
between observed earnings and net potential earnings should not be ruled out a-priori. 
This implies that observed earnings may not coincide with net potential earnings, 
although the former generally depend on the latter.      
As additional feature, the model keeps into account the stylized fact that observed 
earnings exhibit path-dependence. To the best of our knowledge, this feature is novel 
because the existing (micro and macro) evidence on the autoregressive nature of 
observed earnings2 has not received attention in Mincerian studies so far.   
To anticipate the model’s conclusion, current observed earnings are shown to be 
dependent on both past observed earnings and current net potential earnings. 
 
Let us assume that the logarithm of the observed earnings of an employee arises from a 
simple, decentralized Nash bargaining between an employee and an employer and that: 
 
• Employee objective function: the employee maximizes his/her observed 
earnings at time t3, namely the employee maximizes t
employee
t wlnU = ; 
• Employer objective function: the employer maximizes the difference between 
the monetary value of the employee’s  net productivity at time t and the salary 
that he/she has to pay to the employee, namely the employer maximizes 
tt
employer
t wlnnpelnU −= ; 
• Employee outside option: if bargaining fails, the outside option for the employee 
is the unemployment benefit at time t, i.e. t
employee
t blnU
~ = ; 
• Employer outside option: if bargaining fails, the outside option for the employer 
is 0U~ employert =  because the employer neither gets the monetary value of the 
employee’s net productivity nor pays a salary; 
• Nash bargaining function: the Nash bargaining function has a Cobb-Douglas 
specification, i.e. ρ−ρ −−= 1employertemployertemployeetemployeett )U~U()U~U(U . 
 
As usual in the literature, the coefficient [ ]1,0∈ρ  in the Nash bargaining function is 
interpreted as the bargaining power of the employee, while ρ−1  is the bargaining 
power of the employer.  
For sake of simplicity, we further assume that the unemployment benefit at time t is 
proportional to the salary of the employee at time 1t − , i.e. 1tt wb −λ=  where λ  is the 
so-called replacement rate. This assumption is somehow restrictive because the 
unemployment benefit of an individual at a given point in time usually depends on the 
whole wage history of the individual, not just the last wage. Using just the last wage 
makes model calculations easier but less general (see also Section 4). However, in many 
countries (especially in Europe), the last wage plays an important specific role in 
determining the level of the unemployment benefit. In addition, since observed wages 
                                                 
2 See Taylor (1999) for a good survey.  
3 Note that both observed and net potential earnings must be measured in logarithms to be consistent with 
the Mincerian assumption (2).   
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are autoregressive in nature, the last wage is likely to incorporate information about the 
whole wage history of an individual.   
Solving the employer-employee bargaining problem provides the following first-order 
condition: 
 
tt1tt wlnnpeln
1
wlnlnwln −
ρ−=−λ−
ρ
−
                                                                           (4) 
 
which, in turn, gives: 
 
t1tt npelnwln)1(ln)1(wln ρ+ρ−+λρ−= −                                                                   (5) 
 
Hence, if the employee has full bargaining power ( 1=ρ ), then expression (5) becomes 
expression (2) and the standard Mincerian model holds. Intuitively, only when the 
employee has full bargaining power, he/she is actually able to earn all his/her net 
potential earnings. In this case, the employer is indifferent between employing and not 
employing because 0U~U employert
employer
t == .   
On the other hand, if the employee has zero bargaining power ( 0=ρ ), then expression 
(5) implies 1tt wlnlnwln −+λ=  which, in turn, implies t1tt blnwlnwln =λ= − . In this 
case, the employee is indifferent between working and being unemployed because 
employee
t
employee
t U
~U = .   
In general, when the bargaining power of the employee is neither null nor full 
( 10 <ρ< ), replacing expression (1) into (5) gives:  
 ( )232101tt zzswln)1(ln)1(wln α+α+α+αρ+ρ−+λρ−≈ −                                          (6) 
 
or alternatively: 
 
2
4321t10t zzswlnwln β+β+β+β+β≈ −                                                                         (7) 
 
where 00 ln)1( ρα+λρ−=β , ρ−=β 11 , 12 ρα=β , 23 ρα=β  and 34 ρα=β . 
Expression (7) is a dynamic version of the Mincer equation. Note that the bargaining 
power of the employer ρ−1  can be estimated, when individual-level longitudinal data 
are available, and the theory underlying (7) can be tested. The main requirement for the 
theory to be consistent with the data is to find that the coefficient 1β  is significantly 
different from zero. The next Section provides empirical evidence supporting (7). 
 
3. Evidence 
   
We use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile-regression techniques4 (QR) to 
explore 1994-2001 data on Spanish male workers extracted from the European 
                                                 
4 We present estimates from the 10th to the 90th quantile of the conditional wage distribution, with a step 
of ten quantiles.  
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Community Household Panel (ECHP). Sample statistics are in Table I. Table II presents 
estimates based on model (3), i.e. the static Mincer equation. Table III contains 
estimates based on model (7), i.e. the dynamic Mincer equation.  
The main point of this Section, presented in Table III, is that the employee does not 
have full bargaining power because the estimated bargaining power of the employer 
( 1β ) is significantly different from zero, both on average (OLS) and along the 
conditional wage distribution (QR). Therefore, the standard Mincerian assumption (2) is 
unlikely to hold. This empirical finding, based on Spanish data, is consistent with 
previous evidence concerning both Portuguese5 (see Andini, forthcoming) and U.S. 
data6 (see Andini, 2007). 
It is worth noting that the estimated bargaining power of the employer is higher then 
one-half, both on average (0.7178) and along the conditional wage distribution. This is 
consistent with the common belief that, in general, the bargaining power of the 
employer is higher than the bargaining power of the employee (the implicit bargaining 
power of the employee is estimated at 0.2822, on average).  
Another interesting finding, presented in Figure 1, is that pattern of the estimated 
bargaining power of the employer, along the conditional earnings distribution, is 
consistent with earlier results provided by Andini (2007) and Andini (forthcoming). On 
the one hand, as one would reasonably expect, the bargaining power of the employer is 
lower at the highest deciles of the conditional wage distribution. On the other hand, 
minimum-wage regulation, reducing the bargaining power of the employer at the lowest 
deciles, may explain why the pattern in Figure 1 is a bit inverse-U shaped. 
Finally note that, from a theoretical point of view, the static-model return to schooling 
1α  is exactly equivalent to the dynamic-model return to schooling 
1
2
1 β−
β  because 
1
1
1
2
)1(11
α=ρ−−
ρα=β−
β . The OLS estimation in Table II and III confirms the 
equivalence prediction7. An explanation of why the QR estimates of these two returns 
may not coincide has been provided by Andini (2007)8.  
                  
 
 
                                                 
5 Data on male workers aged between 16 and 65 from the European Community Household Panel, 1994-
2001. 
   
6 Data on male workers aged between 17 and 30 from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1980-
1987. 
   
7 Andini (forthcoming) argues that both these two returns should not be interpreted as returns in terms of 
observed earnings. They should be interpreted as returns in terms of net potential earnings. The return to 
schooling in terms of observed earnings at time t is dependent on labor-market experience z and is given 
by ( )Z1312112zst ...1swlnswln β++β+β+β+β=∂∂=∂∂ + . 
  
8 The QR estimator is based on stricter assumptions of correct model-specification than the OLS 
estimator. Therefore, not controlling for lagged observed earnings in the standard static Mincer equation 
implies that QR estimates are more likely to be seriously biased than OLS estimates.    
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4. Conclusion 
 
We do not claim for generality. The theoretical model in Section 2 holds under a set of 
specific assumptions. The main issue is whether these assumptions bring us closer to 
reality (enhanced role of demand factors in determining wages) or not. In any case, 
there seems to be substantial empirical evidence supporting the argument that past 
observed earnings, together with accumulated human capital (schooling and post-
schooling investments), play an important role in explaining current observed earnings. 
This finding should open the door to new research effort looking for alternative, and 
perhaps more general, micro-foundations of a dynamic Mincer equation. Issues related 
to asymmetric information (for instance, the case where the employer does not observe 
the net potential earnings of the employee), role of unions (wage bargaining at 
collective level and insider-outsider considerations) and efficiency wages (the employer 
cannot observe the employee’s effort) are interesting topics for future investigation.            
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Table I. Sample statistics 
 
 Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
 
Logarithm of hourly wage 15040 6.83 0.53 2.31 9.38 
Schooling years  15040 10.54 3.75 2.00 27.00 
Potential labor-market experience 15040 17.57 12.41 0.00 55.00 
Age 15040 36.10 11.27 16.00 65.00 
 
 
 
 
Table II. Static model 
 
 0α  1α  2α  3α  
 
R-squared 
QR(10) 5.1181 0.0675 0.0459 -0.00070 0.1329 
QR(20) 5.2990 0.0694 0.0437 -0.00064 0.1450 
QR(30) 5.4009 0.0732 0.0419 -0.00059 0.1572 
QR(40) 5.4967 0.0742 0.0415 -0.00058 0.1707 
QR(50) 5.5747 0.0759 0.0413 -0.00056 0.1880 
QR(60) 5.6401 0.0793 0.0407 -0.00054 0.2096 
QR(70) 5.7153 0.0814 0.0406 -0.00052 0.2333 
QR(80) 5.8325 0.0829 0.0392 -0.00049 0.2535 
QR(90) 5.9925 0.0846 0.0389 -0.00047 0.2674 
      
OLS 5.5407 0.0767 0.0433 -0.00060 0.3502 
 
 
 
 
Table III. Dynamic model 
 
 
 
0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  
1
2
1 β−
β  R-squared 
QR(10) 1.0240 0.7663 0.0178 0.0113 -0.00015 0.0761 0.3933 
QR(20) 1.1317 0.7729 0.0186 0.0087 -0.00011 0.0819 0.4269 
QR(30) 1.2432 0.7734 0.0168 0.0074 -0.00009 0.0741 0.4523 
QR(40) 1.2805 0.7769 0.0174 0.0061 -0.00006 0.0779 0.4727 
QR(50) 1.3724 0.7753 0.0163 0.0047 -0.00003* 0.0725 0.4904 
QR(60) 1.5410 0.7556 0.0182 0.0045 -0.00003* 0.0744 0.5051 
QR(70) 1.7095 0.7415 0.0190 0.0027 -0.00000** 0.0735 0.5143 
QR(80) 1.9044 0.7196 0.0216 0.0030 -0.00000** 0.0770 0.5160 
QR(90) 2.2594 0.6762 0.0274 0.0034 -0.00001** 0.0846 0.5099 
        
OLS 1.6788 0.7187 0.0216 0.0066 -0.00006 0.0767 0.7094 
       
 
Note that all the estimated coefficients in Table II and Table III are significant at 1% level, apart from 
those marked with * (significant at 5% level) or ** (not significant).     
 
 
 8
Figure 1. Bargaining power of the employer 
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